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            This paper explores the relationship between patterns of productivity growth and 
the development stage of an industry, using firm-level data on the cotton spinning 
industry in Japan in the late nineteenth century. It is found that patterns of 
productivity growth depend on the development stage of the industry. In the earlier 
stage of industrial development, productivity growth of each firm, namely the within 
effect, was the sole major source of aggregate productivity growth. On the other hand, 
once the industry had matured, resource reallocation across firms became a major 
source of aggregate productivity growth, along with the within effect. This relationship 
between patterns of productivity growth and the development stage of an industry is 
considered to reflect the stage-dependent patterns of innovation and competition.   
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      There is a growing body of literature which focuses on the heterogeneity of firms 
and establishments, and its implications for productivity change. As shown in the 
survey by Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001), the findings of this strand of 
literature include the following: (i) there is a large-scale reallocation of resources across 
individual producers, (ii) the pace of resource reallocation varies over time and across 
sectors, and (iii) much of this reallocation reflects within-sector, rather than 
between-sector, reallocation1. On the other hand, there is another strand of literature 
which addresses the evolution of market structure through the entry and exit of firms. 
Among others, Gort and Klepper (1982) established stylized facts on product market 
evolution, according to the net entry rate of firms. Based on Gort and Klepper (1982), 
Agarwal and Gort (1996) investigated the effect of the development stage of the market 
on the entry and exit of firms, finding that both entry and exit are profoundly affected 
by stage-related changes2. 
      This paper aims to integrate these two strands of literature to explore the 
implications of the development stage of an industry for patterns of productivity growth. 
Given the findings of Agarwal and Gort (1996), we can infer that the pattern of 
productivity growth is affected by the development stage of an industry. However, in 
order to examine whether or not this is the case, it is essential to have detailed and 
comprehensive firm-level productivity data which cover the whole life cycle of the 
industry. This is considered to be one of the basic reasons for the lack of studies which 
integrate the above two strands of literature.   
In this paper, we address this data availability problem by focusing on the case of 
prewar Japan. Japan started its industrialization based on modern technology in the 
late nineteenth century. The cotton spinning industry played a major role at this time. 
While it is true that a cotton spinning industry existed in pre-modern Japan, i.e., during 
the Tokugawa era, the industry had declined due to the importation of cotton yarn from 
the Western countries, after which the modern cotton spinning industry, based on 
Western technology, developed from scratch in Japan in the late nineteenth century. In 
this sense, the modern cotton spinning industry in Japan is an ideal field for the study 
                                                  
1  The articles in this strand include Aw, Chen and Roberts (2001), Baily, Bartlesman 
and Haltiwanger (2001), Baily, Hultan and Campbell (1992), Baldwin (1995), 
Batlesman and Doms (2000), Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2006), Foster, 
Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008), and Griliches and Regev (1995). 
2  The articles in this strand include Agarwal and Gort (2002), Dunne, Roberts and 
Samelson (1989), Jovnovic (1982), Klepper (1996), Klepper and Graddy (1990), Klepper 
and Simons (2000), Klepper and Simons (2005), Klepper and Thompson (2006), 
Londregan (1990), and Manuszak (2002).     proposed above. Furthermore, one notable feature of the Japanese cotton spinning 
industry is that detailed firm-level data are available from the 1890s. Using these data, 
we can not only identify the entry and exit of firms, but also compute firm-level 
productivity and market share, which allows us to observe the patterns of productivity 
growth. In addition, we can rely on the findings of the literature on the history of the 
Japanese cotton spinning industry. The cotton spinning industry is the one that 
economic historians have investigated in the most depth. This is also a great advantage 
of focusing on the case of the prewar Japanese cotton spinning industry.                     
      This  paper  is  organized  as  follows. Section 2 summarizes the historical 
development of the cotton spinning industry in prewar Japan. Section 3 describes the 
data and the basic statistics. In section 4, we analyze the productivity growth pattern by 
stage of industrial development. Section 5 concludes the paper.           
 
2. Development of the cotton spinning industry in Japan: an overview 
       The modern cotton spinning industry in Japan dates back to the 1870s, when 
the Meiji government, which assumed power from the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1868, 
established two state-owned cotton spinning factories in order to promote 
industrialization. The government also promoted private firms by selling imported 
spinning machines at preferential prices. Nine private firms were founded based on 
these machines. However, all of these factories were unsuccessful, as they were too 
small in scale and made errors in choosing power sources, which in turn was due to a 
lack of qualified engineers and a shortage of capital (Abe 1990; Farnie and Abe 2000; 
Takamura  1971).   
       T h e  c o m p a n y  w h i c h  p a v e d  t h e  w a y  for the modern cotton spinning industry in 
Japan was Osaka Boseki Co., which was established in 1880. The entrepreneur who led 
the foundation of Osaka Boseki Co. was Eiichi Shibusawa, the President of Daiichi 
Bank, and a big name in modern Japanese economic history. Indeed, he was involved in 
the foundation and management of almost 500 companies. Due to the leadership of 
Shibusawa, Osaka Boseki employed a competent engineer and manager, Kentaro 
Yamanobe, who had studied in Britain, while the company raised large amounts of 
capital from a wide range of investors thanks to Shibusawa’s reputation in Japanese 
business circles.   
One of the distinctive features of Osaka Boseki, compared with its predecessors, 
was the scale of its equipment. Whereas the standard number of spindles owned by its 
predecessor companies was 2000, Osaka Boseki had 15,000 spindles driven by steam 
engines. At the same time, Osaka Boseki was innovative in terms of factory operations, operating its factory throughout the day using double-shift working arrangements. This 
practice allowed the company to reduce its capital-labor ratio and adjust its imported 
technology to factor endowment conditions in nineteenth century Japan (Abe 1990; 
Minami 1986; Nakaoka 1986; Okazaki 1997).   
      Osaka Boseki achieved good financial performance on its operation in 1883, 
which induced many new entrants to the cotton spinning industry. Consequently, in the 
late 1880s, cotton yarn production increased sharply (Figure 1). As early as 1891, cotton 
yarn production outstripped imports. Furthermore, in the early 1890s, two additional 
developments occurred. First, a new type of spinning machine, namely the ring frame, 
was introduced and soon became widely adopted, replacing the mule frame. The ring 
frame was not only easier to operate, but was also more efficient than the mule frame 
(Farnie and Abe 2000; Abe 1990; Kiyokawa 1987; Ushijima 1995). It is notable that 
Japan was the country where the replacement of the mule frame by the ring frame 
proceeded most quickly and comprehensively (Kiyokawa 1987).   
The second development is that India came to be a new source of raw cotton, 
which contributed to a reduction in the cost of raw materials. Based on these two 
developments, Japan started to export cotton yarn in the early 1890s, and cotton yarn 
exports exceeded imports as early as the late 1890s (Abe 1990; Farnie and Abe 2000). 
The ratio of exports to total cotton yarn production rose sharply, reaching 45.0% in 1899. 
During this process of import substitution and transition to an export industry, the rate 
of growth in cotton yarn production was very high. Indeed, the annual average 




       In Figure 1, it is notable that production fell markedly in 1899. In addition, 
although not so clear as the one in 1899, there was another fall in production around 
1916. The first fall coincides with the peak of the export ratio, while the second one 
coincides with the start of its decline. The average annual production growth rate was 
5.6% from 1899 to 1916, while it was only 3.1% from 1916 to 1936.   
       These three phases observed in Figure 1 are basically consistent with the 
findings of the literature on the history of the Japanese cotton spinning industry. In the 
literature, it has been stressed that the Japanese cotton spinning industry, which had 
developed rapidly in the 1890s, began to face difficulties in the 1900s. The causes of 
these difficulties include (a) Japan’s transition to the gold standard and the depreciation of silver3, (b) the recovery of the Indian cotton spinning industry, which had stagnated 
due to the plague, to compete with the Japanese cotton spinning industry in China’s 
domestic market, (c) increases in wages and interest rates in Japan, and (d) the rapid 
expansion of equipment in the 1890s (Abe 1990; Farnie and Abe 2000; Miyamoto 1986). 
Factors (a),(b) and (c) are related to the stagnation of exports.   
Looking at the transition from the second phase to the third phase, it has been 
revealed that the cotton spinning industry developed in China during the First World 
War, which led to a rise in the cotton yarn tariff in that country. Combined with a sharp 
rise in Japanese wages, the Japanese cotton spinning industry came to be unable to 
compete with the Chinese cotton spinning industry in China’s domestic market in the 
late 1910s (Abe 2005; Takamura 1985). To cope with this situation, Japanese cotton 
spinning firms started investing directly in China during the 1920s, while accelerating 
the diversification of their businesses into cloth processing, silk spinning, silk reeling, 
etc.    
 
3. The data and descriptive statistics 
   The basic data source for the following analyses is the Monthly Report of the 
Spinner’s Association. The original title of the Monthly Report changed several times, 
but it continued to be published from May 1889 throughout the whole prewar period4. 
Of particular importance to this paper is the appendix table in the report, “Operating 
State of Cotton Spinning Firms in Japan,” which contains firm-level information such 
as production figures, average yarn count5, average wage rate by sex, number of 
workers by sex, number of operating days and average daily operating hours6.  
As the issues of the Monthly Report from June 1892 to April 1893 lack an 
appendix table, we focus on the period from 1894, when complete data became available 
for each year. By adding up the monthly data for each firm by year, we have prepared 
firm-level annual data from 1894 to 1924. This period covers the three phases of the 
                                                  
3  The major destination country for exports of Japanese cotton yarn was China, which 
adopted the silver standard.     
4  The earlier titles were Rengo Boseki Geppo (May 1889 to June 1891), Boshoku Geppo 
(July 1891 to June 1892), Menshi Boseki Dogyo Rengokai Hokoku (September 1892 to 
December 1901), Menshi Boseki Dogyo Rengokai Geppo (January 1902 to November 
1902) and Menshi Boseki Rengokai Geppo (from December 1902). 
5  Count is a unit of the diameter of cotton yarn. A larger count indicates a smaller 
diameter. In those days, the standard count was 20. 
6  An alternative basic data source is the Cotton Spinning Industry Handbook (Menshi 
Boseki Jijo Sankosho). The data from this source are more tractable in that they were 
totaled on a biannual basis. However, as the Handbook was first published in 1903, I 
prefer the Monthly Report of the Spinner’s Association. development of the cotton spinning industry identified in section 2. Table 1 shows the 
number of firms covered in the data set7. As we will see below, the number of firms 
changed substantially over time. The maximum number of firms was 79 (1899), while 
the minimum was 35 (1912).    It is notable that the proportion of industry data covered 
in the Monthly Report was very high. Indeed, the ratio of cotton yarn production 
included in the Monthly Report to cotton yarn production reported in Ministry of 
Agriculture and Commerce statistics was close to 100%8. 
  Labor productivity for each firm is calculated by (cotton yarn production 
converted into 20 count yarn) / (hours worked converted into female labor). To convert 
cotton yarn production into 20 count yarn, we use the estimated relative price of each 
count of yarn to 20 count yarn, following Fujino, Fujino and Ono (1979)9. That is, we 
first estimate a log linear relationship between the relative price and the count, based 
on the price data in Fujino et al. 1979 (p.49), then combine it with the average count 
information for each firm in the Monthly Report to convert each firm’s yarn production 
into 20 count yarn. Similarly, we convert male workers into female workers by 
multiplying the former by the relative average wage rate for male workers to that for 
f e m a l e   w o r k e r s .                  
     The solid line in Figure 2 shows aggregate labor productivity from 1894 to 1924. 
Aggregate labor productivity increased substantially over this 30-year period. Indeed, it 
was 2.1 times higher in 1924 than in 1894. Meanwhile, variance of productivity across 
firms changed over time as well, as the dotted line indicates. The coefficient of variation 
was initially relatively low and flat until the 1900s. The coefficient of variation then 
went up sharply until the end of 1910s, subsequently declining in the 1920s. An 
increase in variance implies an increase in firm heterogeneity in terms of labor 
productivity, which in turn suggests the possibility that firm dynamics may affect 
aggregate labor productivity (Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan 2001). 
       Table 1 summarizes the entry and exit of cotton spinning firms. In the 1890s, 
the number of firms increased sharply, mainly due to a high entry rate after the 
Sino-Japanese War in 1894 and 1895. The number of firms peaked in 1899, followed by 
a declining trend that continued until the early 1910s. Compared with the 1890s, entry 
numbers declined in the 1900s, while exit numbers increased sharply. Exits represent 
                                                  
7  Some firms suspended operations for a whole year, subsequently resuming operations. 
In any such case, the firm is regarded as having exited and re-entered the industry.     
8  For example, 97.6%, 97.8% and 99.0% for 1894, 1904 and 1914, respectively. The 
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce data are taken from Toyokeizai Shinposha 
(1927).  
9  Monthly average count data for each firm is averaged for each year (arithmetic 
average). closures, as well as mergers and acquisitions. The year in which the number of firms 
started to decline coincided with the beginning of the second phase of industrial 
development described in the previous section. It is suggested that the first downward 
movement in production growth triggered a reorganization of the industry. The number 
of firms then gradually increased again10 from the early 1910s. As the production 
growth rate was declining during this period, we can infer that competition between 
firms became intense.     
 
(Table 1) 
       
Next, let us observe the basic statistics on firm dynamics and labor productivity 
(Table 2). In the subsequent analyses, we split the whole observation period into three 
sub-periods, namely (i) 1894-1904, (ii) 1904-1914, and (iii) 1914-1924. The whole 
observation period is split equally, because we will conduct a decomposition analysis of 
productivity growth in the next section and it is known that decomposition results 
depend on the length of the observation period (Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan 2001). 
Compared with the three phases of industrial development described in section 2, 
period (i) covers part of the first and the second phases, period (ii) covers part of the 
second phase, and period (iii) roughly corresponds to the third phase. 
 
(Table 2) 
      
          Panel A of Table 2 indicates that there were 45 cotton spinning firms in 1894. Of 
these firms, 22 survived until 1904, the remaining 23 firms having exited by then. 
During the same period of time, 25 firms entered the industry. With respect to 1894, the 
average scale of production of the firms that survived until 1904 was larger, compared 
with the industry average, which implies that the scale of the exiting firms was smaller. 
On the other hand, the aggregate labor productivity of the surviving and exiting firms 
was not substantially different from the industry average. This fact corresponds to the 
low coefficient of variation shown in Figure 2, indicating that the exit of those firms did 
not contribute to the increase in average labor productivity of the industry, as we will 
confirm in the next section.   
In 1904, the average scale of production of the surviving firms was about 2.4 times 
                                                  
10  The periods of pre-1899, 1899-1912 and post-1912 correspond to the stage 2, stage 4 
and stage 5 periods used in Gort and Klepper (1982) and Agarwal and Gort (1996), 
respectively.  larger than it had been in 1894, and was much larger than the scale of the firms that 
entered the industry in the same year. At the same time, the aggregate labor 
productivity of the surviving firms increased substantially. The aggregate labor 
productivity of the entering firms was also higher than that for the industry as a whole 
in 1894, which implies that the entry of those firms positively contributed to an increase 
in aggregate labor productivity of the industry. Nevertheless, compared with the 
surviving firms in 1904, it was lower. 
      There were 47 firms in 1904, of which 24 survived until 1914 and 23 had exited 
by then, while 21 firms entered the industry (Panel B of Table 2). With respect to 1904, 
the average scale of production of the firms that survived until 1914 was larger than the 
industry average. On the other hand, the aggregate labor productivity of the surviving 
and exiting firms was not substantially different from the industry average, and 
furthermore, the aggregate labor productivity of the exiting firms was slightly higher 
than the industry average. This implies that the exit of those firms had a negative 
impact on aggregate labor productivity. The average scale of production of the surviving 
firms became 2.55 times larger during this period, and was much larger than the scale 
of production of the firms that entered the industry in 1914. The aggregate labor 
productivity of the surviving firms increased substantially during this period. The 
aggregate labor productivity of the entering firms was also higher than that of the 
industry as a whole in 1904, but, as in the previous period, was lower when compared 
with the surviving firms in 1914. 
      Looking at the final period, there were 45 firms in 1914, of which 24 survived 
until 1924 and 21 had exited by then, while 31 firms entered the industry (Panel C of 
Table 2). With respect to 1914, the average scale of production of the firms that survived 
until 1924 was larger than the industry average, but the difference was much smaller 
compared with the previous two periods. This reflects the fact that some large firms 
exited through mergers during this period11. On the other hand, a substantial difference 
in labor productivity across the firm categories appeared for the first time during this 
period, whereby the aggregate labor productivity of the exiting firms was substantially 
lower than the industry average in 1914, which implies that the exit of those firms 
positively contributed to the increase in aggregate labor productivity. The average scale 
of production of the surviving firms also increased during this period, but the growth 
rate declined. The aggregate labor productivity of the surviving firms increased, as in 
                                                  
11  Osaka Boseki Co. and Mie Boseki Co. were merged into a new company, Tokyo Boseki 
Co., in 1914, while Amagasaki Boseki Co. merged with Settsu Boseki Co. to become 
Dainihon Boseki Co. in 1918. Tokyo Boseki and Dainihon Boseki became two of the 
three largest cotton spinning companies in Japan, along with Kanegafuchi Boseki Co. previous periods. The aggregate labor productivity of the entering firms was also higher 
than the industry average in 1914. Furthermore, it was almost equivalent to that of the 
surviving firms in 1924. This is also a phenomenon that was observed for the first time 
during this period.   
 
4. Firm dynamics and productivity growth 
            Based on our observation of the basic statistics in Table 2, we can infer the trends 
in the effects of firm dynamics on aggregate labor productivity. However, in order to 
assess the magnitude of these effects, we need to decompose the change in aggregate 
labor productivity. Here, we employ a standard formula for productivity change 
decomposition (Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan 2001, 2006). The average labor 




whereθi,t  and Pi,t denote the weight of firm i in year t in terms of labor input and the 
labor productivity of firm i in year t, respectively. Weight is measured in terms of labor 
input.  ΔPt＝Pt -Pt-1 can be decomposed into the following five factors: 
 
within effect:  Σi∈Sθi,t-1×ΔPi,t 
between effect:  Σi∈SΔθi,t×（Pi,t-1－Pt-1） 
covariance effect:  Σi∈SΔθi,t×ΔPi,t 
exit effect:  Σi∈Xθi,t-1×(Pt-1－Pi,t-1) 
entry effect:  Σi∈Nθi,t×(Pi,t－Pt-1） 
 
where S, X and N denote the set of firms that survive from year t-1 to t, firms that exit 
during this period and firms that enter during this period, respectively. The within 
effect captures the fraction of aggregate labor productivity change which can be 
attributed to each firm’s productivity change. The between effect and the within effect 
capture the effect of a reallocation of resources across surviving firms. If firms which are 
more efficient than the industry average increase their shares, the between effect is 
positive, and vice versa. If firms whose productivity goes up increase their shares, or if 
firms whose productivity goes down decrease their shares, the covariance effect is 
positive, and vice versa. The exit effect and the entry effect capture the productivity 
implication of firm replacement. If the productivity of exiting firms is lower than the 
industry average in year t-1, or if the productivity of entering firms is higher than the industry average in year t, these effects are positive, and vice versa. The four effects 
other than the within effect capture the labor productivity change due to general 
resource  reallocation.        
      The results of decomposition using the above formula are reported in Table 3. 
First of all, the fraction of productivity growth due to the within effect differs between 
the pre-1914 period and the 1914-1924 period. Whereas almost all of the productivity 
growth in the former period can be attributed to the within effect, the contribution of 
the within effect declined to 50.2% in the 1914-1924 period. This finding indicates that 
the patterns of labor productivity growth changed substantially over time. That is, 
whereas in the former period, productivity growth of each firm was the basic source of 
aggregate productivity growth, in the 1914-1924 period, the general reallocation of 
resources across firms became a major source of aggregate productivity growth, along 
with productivity growth of each firm.   
This was partly due to the decline in the magnitude of the within effect, but was 
also because of the increase in the magnitude of the other four effects. The sum of the 
between and covariance effects indicates the effect of resource reallocation across the 
surviving firms. In the pre-1914 period, the contribution of this factor was negative, but 
subsequently became positive. Finally, the sum of the exit and entry effects, namely the 
effect of firm replacement, was largest in the 1914-1924 period. In particular, the exit 
effect was much larger in that period when compared with the previous two periods.       
          
(Table 3) 
 
        Overall, the particularity of the 1914-1924 period stands out. In this period, 
while the magnitude of the within effect declined, the effect of general resource 
reallocation increased. Next, we will reexamine this feature using regression analysis, 
following Foster et al. (2006) by estimating the following equation for each of the three 




ENTERit is a dummy variable which equals 1, if firm i entered the industry during the 
period, and 0, otherwise. EXITit is a dummy variable which equals 1, if firm i exited 
from the industry during the period, and 0, otherwise. ENDYEARt is a dummy variable 
which equals 1, if the year is the end of the period, and 0, if otherwise. eit is the error 
term. The results of the OLS estimation are reported in Table 4.    
(Table 4) 
 
First, the EXIT coefficient is negative and statistically significant only for 
1914-1924. This is consistent with the results shown in Table 3, in which the exit effect 
was small in 1894-1904 and negative in 1904-1914, but became positive and large in 
1914-1924. Second, the ENTER coefficient is not statistically significant. This implies 
that after controlling for the overall productivity growth of the industry using 
ENDYEARt, the labor productivity of the entering firms was not significantly different 
from the other firms, including the exiting firms. In other words, the positive entry 
effect shown in Table 3 basically reflects the overall productivity growth of the industry. 
On the other hand, the ENDYEARt coefficient has a declining tend. This is interpreted 
as a reflection of the maturity of the industry.     
Integrating these results with the observations made in the previous sections, we 
have a consistent picture of industrial development, firm dynamics and productivity 
growth patterns. In the first period (1894-1904), when the cotton spinning industry was 
establishing its international competitiveness and the number of firms rose and fell 
sharply, productivity across firms generally grew, and hence the implication of resource 
reallocation across firms was small. To put it differently, the within effect explained 
almost all of the aggregate productivity growth. In the second period (1904-1914), when 
the industry was on a stable growth path, the shakeout of firms continued. Meanwhile, 
as in the first period, productivity across firms generally grew, and hence the 
implication of resource reallocation across firms was small. Finally, in the third period 
(1914-1924), when the industry was losing its international competitiveness, the 
number of firms ceased to decline, but exits continued and came to be associated with a 
firm’s productivity. While overall productivity growth declined, resource reallocation 
across firms came to be a major source of aggregate  productivity  growth.           
 
5. Concluding remarks 
            In this paper, we have explored the relationship between patterns of productivity 
growth and the development stage of an industry, using firm-level data on the cotton 
spinning industry in Japan in the late nineteenth century. We have found that patterns 
of productivity growth depend on the development stage of the industry. In the earlier 
stage of industrial development, productivity growth of each firm, namely the within 
effect, was the sole major source of aggregate productivity growth. This is because 
overall productivity growth was high, and exits were not associated with productivity. On the other hand, once the industry had matured, resource reallocation across firms 
became a major source of aggregate productivity growth, along with the within effect. 
This is because overall productivity growth declined, while exits came to be associated 
with a firm’s productivity.   
      This relationship between patterns of productivity growth and the development 
stage of an industry is considered to reflect the stage-dependent patterns of innovation 
and competition. Agarwahl and Gort (2002) reveal that in the early years of an industry, 
technological opportunities for innovation are high, while as the industry matures, 
technological opportunities decline and innovations increasingly shift to product 
refinement and cost reduction, which intensifies competition. The change over time in 
overall productivity growth and the exit patterns we found in this paper are consistent 
with the conclusion reached by Agarwahl and Gort (2002). This paper has clarified the 
implications of this stage-dependent pattern of innovation and competition for patterns 
of productivity growth, integrating the framework and findings in the literature on the 
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Log of production(left scale)
Import/production







1895 47 4 2 2 0
1896 60 14 1 1 0
1897 63 7 4 4 0
1898 75 14 2 1 1
1899 79 8 4 3 1
1900 67 3 15 7 8
1901 64 3 6 4 2
1902 64 3 3 3 0
1903 55 4 13 9 4
1904 47 1 9 4 5
1905 50 6 3 1 2
1906 51 5 4 3 1
1907 49 3 5 0 5
1908 39 0 10 0 10
1909 37 2 4 2 2
1910 37 1 1 1 0
1911 36 1 2 2 0
1912 35 2 3 0 3
1913 41 9 3 2 1
1914 45 4 0 0 0
1915 41 3 7 4 3
1916 39 2 4 1 3
1917 42 5 2 0 2
1918 47 7 2 0 2
1919 47 6 6 1 5
1920 54 9 2 0 2
1921 58 5 1 1 0
1922 67 13 4 1 3
1923 59 1 9 5 4
1924 55 1 5 3 2
Source: Various issues of the Monthly Report of the Japan Spinner's Association .



































Labor productivity (left scale)
Coefficient of variation (right scale)Table 2 Basic statistics by firm category
A.1894-1904
1894 1904
Total Production Total ton 56,679 126,609
（N=45, 47) Average ton 1,260 2,694
Labor productivity Weighted average kg/manhour 0.409 0.525
Surviving firms Production Total ton 38,789 92,854
（N=22) Average ton 1,763 4,221
Labor productivity Weighted average kg/manhour 0.414 0.547
Exiting firms Production Total ton 17,890 －
(N=23) Average ton 778 －
Labor productivity Weighted average kg/manhour 0.399 －
Entering firms Production Total ton － 33,755
（N=25) Average ton － 1,350
Labor productivity Weighted average kg/manhour － 0.473
B.1904-1914
1904 1914
Total Production Total ton 126,609 307,265
（N=47, 45) Average ton 2,694 6,828
Labor productivity Weighted average kg/manhour 0.525 0.664
Surviving firms Production Total ton 95,420 243,729
（N=24) Average ton 3,976 10,155
Labor productivity Weighted average kg/manhour 0.516 0.681
Exiting firms Production Total ton 31,189 －
(N=23) Average ton 1,356 －
Labor productivity Weighted average kg/manhour 0.554 －
Entering firms Production Total ton － 63,535
（N=21) Average ton － 3,025
Labor productivity Weighted average kg/manhour － 0.607
C.1914-1924
1914 1924
Total Production Total ton 307,265 405,237
（N=45, 55) Average ton 6,828 7,368
Labor productivity Weighted average kg/manhour 0.664 0.784
Surviving firms Production Total ton 214,643 345,701
（N=24) Average ton 8,943 14,404
Labor productivity Weighted average kg/manhour 0.684 0.784
Exiting firms Production Total ton 92,622 －
(N=21) Average ton 4,411 －
Labor productivity kg/manhour 0.623 －
Entering firms Production Total ton － 59,536
（N=31) Average ton － 1,921
Labor productivity Weighted average kg/manhour － 0.781
Note: See Table1.Table 3 Decomposition of labor productivity growth
1894-1904 1904-1914 1914-1924
Productivity change Totaｌ 0.116 0.139 0.119
　（kg/manhour) Within 0.130 0.132 0.060
Subtotal  -0.037 -0.004 0.029
    Between -0.007 0.028 -0.005
    Covariance -0.030 -0.032 0.034
Subtotal 0.022 0.012 0.031
    Exit 0.003 -0.007 0.013
    Entry 0.019 0.019 0.017
Percentage Totaｌ 100.0 100.0 100.0
Within 112.5 94.5 50.2
Subtotal -31.6 -2.9 24.2
    Between -5.9 20.0 -4.3
    Covariance -25.7 -22.9 28.5
Subtotal 19.1 8.4 25.6
    Exit 2.9 -4.9 11.2
    Entry 16.2 13.3 14.4
Note: See Table1.Table 4 Labor productivity decomposition by regression
1894-1904 1904-1914 1914-1924
EXIT -0.004 0.042 -0.255 ***
(-0.15) (0.79) (-3.63)
ENTER -0.051 0.052 0.050
(-0.97) (0.60) (0.60)
ENDYEAR 0.232 *** 0.095 0.029
(6.15) (1.60) (0.38)
Constant 0.355 *** 0.539 *** 0.776 ***
(24.99) (15.18) (11.86)
R
2 0.348 0.053 0.154
Obs. 92 92 100
Note: White heteroschedasticity robust t values in parenthethes.
        ***  statistically significant at 1% level.